安達 祐子

Abstract This paper traces the survival status of 93,260 Russian business firms in the period of 2007–2019 and empirically examines the determinants of the acquisition of financially distressed companies (i.e., distressed acquisitions). We found that, of 93,260 firms, 50,743 failed in management, and among these distressed firms, 10,110 were rescued by acquisition during the observation period. Our empirical results indicate that, in Russian regions, the weakness of the legal system tends to increase the probability of distressed acquisitions, while other socioeconomic risks negatively affect it. These tendencies are common in most industries and regions. It is also revealed that, in the most-developed area, monotown enterprises are more likely than other firms to be bailed out by acquisition after management failure, but it is not always true for the whole federation.

This article examines the political economy of subsoil law reform under the Putin administration. Despite repeated promises of imminent reform, the overhaul of the main legal basis governing some of the most important sectors of the Russian economy was subjected to repeated delays during the eight years of Putin's presidency. This article shows that the interaction of three major influences-the Kremlin's shifting policy priorities in its relations with subsoil management; the activities of the relevant state bureaucratic institutions; and the interests of the state-controlled mineral extracting companies-added to the complexity and delay.

Why are there so few new firms in Russia? This paper provides further insights into the specific Russian business landscape and how it impacts the low level of new firm entry. As this paper indicates, internationally comparative data do not provide many clues, since in terms of purely formal constraints Russia fares comparatively well. However, a deeper analysis uncovers the informal impediments associated with the lack of rule of law, inconsistent enforcement of regulations, regional autonomy and pervasive corruption. These informal constraints form impediments not only for new firm creation but also for firm survival and firm exit. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

An expert on Russian business analyzes the role of "informal corporate governance practices," that is, practices that are not entirely compatible with the formal rules of corporate governance. These include share dilution, asset stripping, transfer pricing, limiting shareholders' voting rights, and "bankruptcy to order" in Russia's corporate development during the 1990s. Taking Yukos Oil Company, Siberian (Russian) Aluminum, and Noril'sk Nikel' as case studies, the author examines the effect of ICGPs in the Russian economy of the 1990s. Analysis of these case studies is used to understand the complexities involved in post-Soviet enterprise restructuring and the fostering of Russia's corporate sector.