Toshihiro Okuyama

In this study, the perceptions of Tokyo Electric Power Company employees and executives concerning tsunami risk at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station during the years 2008 to 2009, predating the 2011 accident at the facility, are investigated. Newly available court records and other investigative materials are utilized. The findings of this study reveal significant disparities in the perceptions of individuals within the TEPCO organization during the period of interest regarding the risk of tsunami hazards in Fukushima. The perception of tsunami risk and the level of support for long-term evaluation by a government panel, which indicated a high likelihood of a tsunami earthquake near the Japan Trench off the Fukushima coast, exhibited an inverse relationship with one's position within the corporate hierarchy. The employee who held the lowest position in the company was the most concerned about the risk, while those in higher positions were less concerned. This trend can be comprehensively explained by the theory of cognitive dissonance and various biases including affiliation bias, status quo bias, and non-expertise avoidance bias.

This research focuses on the U.S. Department of Justice’s investigation and prosecution of unauthorized disclosures of government information to the media. Based on a review of 21 cases, the research shows trends in the frequency of prosecutions. The investigations and prosecutions by the U.S. Department of Justice （DOJ） and the Federal Bureau of Investigation （FBI） with regard to leaks have gone through some transition. In the 20th century, only four cases were prosecuted. However, the situation has completely changed in this century. Under the Obama administration, there were eight charges against alleged leakers between 2009 and 2013. On the other hand, no such charges were filed from October 2013 to September 2016. Despite President Trump’s pledge for more prosecutions, there have only been five cases since his inauguration. This has occurred notwithstanding the frequency of leaks being about to “explode.” Several factors contribute to this volatility. Among these factors are the DOJ and FBI’s internal codes or norms with which the investigators and prosecutors must comply. For example, between 2005 and 2006, the normal constraints were relaxed, both in terms of investigative procedures with regard to the news media and the scope of the interpretation of the substantive law, such as the Espionage Act. As a result, the frequency of prosecutions increased between 2009 and 2013. However, between 2013 and 2015, the constraints of investigations against the press strengthened significantly under the direction of President Obama. Therefore there was “downtime” between 2013 and 2016. The DOJ serving under the Trump administration announced in 2017 that it was reviewing policies affecting media subpoenas. The announcement can be regarded as evidence of the fact that the change of the norms or internal codes has played an important role in trends in the frequency of prosecutions.