荻野 弘之

Memory is undoubtedly one of the most important concepts in Augustine's anthropology. In the latter books of De Trinitate, there are detailed discussions of how the memory, together with the will and the intelligence, constitute the trinity for the "inner man." In this work, however, the question "what is memory" is never explicitly asked. In Book X of Confessions, on the other hand, we can see several interesting arguments concerning the nature of memory. However, Augustine's investigations do not seem to be scientific; instead he uses a very introspective approach. Indeed, according to Augustine, we cannot even say "I am" without memory (16.25). "In the vast court of my memory, I meet with myself" (8.14), therefore the problem of the nature of memory is nothing but an inquiry into the nature of the Self. It has recently been noticed that Augustine uses such many kinds of spatial metaphors representing the memory, as thesaurus, aula, penetralis, sinus, venter, etc., but almost all of these only appear once or twice in Confessions. Some scholars have tried to explain the reason for his preference for spatial metaphors from various points of view. In any case, we have a tendency to regard the memory in general as something like a storehouse of images corresponding to the things themselves. For the principal role of the memory is thought to be the retention of images once produced by some sense-perception, and according to common sense this is the only way through which our reminiscence occurs. In fact, however, modern scientific research, investigating memory on the basis of this storehouse model, asks "what sort of materials constitute the engramme", "where (in the cerebrum) does that trace lie", and "what is the mechanism of image-production" etc.. I suppose Augustine himself is well aware of the severe difficulties of the metaphor. Having described this model during the first stage of his argument (8.12-15), he proceeds to examine various types of memory (9.16-16.25), which lastly leads him to an aporia; such a model, however, cannot explain the memory of something which was never present to our senses (15.23), the memory of affection (14.21-22), and the phenomenon of oblivion (16.24-25). In order to understand the exact meaning of his preference for spatial metaphors, another motivation needs to be considered; memory is the place where he himself could meet with God as his creator. For "I have not found Thee outside memory. For since I learnt Thee, I have not forgotten Thee" (24.35). Augustin takes the next step of the inquiry: the problem of Memoria Dei.

It is well known that Plato made imitation (mimesis) the general principle of art but also banished poets from his ideal state in the Republic, Book 10. His doctrine seems so paradoxical that not only classical scholars but also general readers have debated it. However in considering the problem it is necessary first to remove various methodological confusions in the interpretation of Plato's Dialogue. (1) Examinations and criticism of the craft of poets had been an essential part of Plato's philosophy since his earliest period. Dramatic poets, who were thought to be wise, could not explain the meaning of what they themselves had written (Apology of Socrates 22A-C); it is thus not wisdom that enables them to write their excellent poetry. The case of the Rhapsodist, who may be called not skilful but divine, is similar (Io. 542B). (2) What kind of poetry is the target of his criticism? I think it is apparently Homer's Epic and contemporary tragedy, because such works represent Gods and Heroes in an attempt to build up popular Greek morality based on Justice and Happiness. (3) Music and poetry constitute the first important part of the Guardian's curriculum in Books 2 and 3. What, then, is the meaning of the accusation against poetry in the context of the whole Dialogue? (4) An opinion which regards the general theory of artistic imitation as the central issue of the first half of Book 10 is quite misleading. The painter is not the subject of discussion; he is, rather, an example to show the imitative aspect of poetry, though admittedly he is a different imitative art. (5) What is the proper function of imitative poetry? First, consider the following question: What is the meaning of word 'red'? This was a famous question in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. We certainly understand 'red', but we cannot define it because we learned the use of this word without definition. When you are asked 'What is "red"?', the best-indeed, the only-answer is to show the questioner something red. In the case of a color this kind of 'ostensive definition' is useful. But what is courage? In fact, this was persistent question for Socrates. It is very difficult to show something courageous because courage is not a visible thing. However, we certainly understand 'courage'. When and how have we learned the use of this word? Dramatic and narrative fiction is the very means through which virtues and merits are vividly incarnated so as to give an ostensive definition. But this way is contrary to the Socratic dialectical approach to the question, 'What is virtue?'

It has been noticed that the first five chapters of Book 1 of the Confessions of St. Augustine have great importance as a preface to the whole. Above all, in Chapter 1, in spite of its brevity, we can find some principal problems of his philosophy and theology: the presentation of the central theme, the foundation of his theological inquiry, the relation of faith and knowledge, the author's skill in various rhetorical techniques, and the function of biblical citations. This chapter consists of different forms of language: biblical quotation, prayer, question, and resolution. On the one hand, it is no doubt a sincere call; on the other hand, it is an elaborately composed display of rhetorical techniques. Indeed, these two aspects are closely connected in producing the eminent expression of the Confessions, though they seems apparently inconsistent with each other. For the sake of understanding the perspective of Augustine's hermeneutical inquiry, an exact comprehension of the structure of the original text and literary analysis are indispensable. I suppose that this chapter could be divided into six paragraphs: (1) By joining two similar verses, the two lines made up of the quotation from the Psalms acquire a vivid parallelism, and the third person account is transformed into a second person calling. Above all, this praise is nothing but the end of both writing and reading the Confessions, according to the opening of Book 11. (2) The second paragraph, which is formed by inclusio, focusses on the man who would praise his Creator. On the other hand, however, the human being is also proud, sinful, and mortal, and so unrelated to praising. (3) The third paragraph may be one of the most famous phrases in the Confessions. The fact that man delights to praise God is based on his being created for God Himself; for the same reason, our heart is restless until it reposes in Him. What is the meaning of the scripture which says the human being has been created in the image of God? In fact, this sentence of the Genesis was not self-evident for Augustine, but a lifelong problem to be inquired into. (4) From this paragraph the narration takes a new turn. Augustine asked himself whether it was necessary to know God before one could call on Him. Although this seems to be a kind version of the socalled "aporia of inquiry" in Plato's Meno, the central question is not the necessary condition of inquiry in general, but the meaning of "knowing Thee", which had been a serious problem of Augustine's philosophy since his earliest period. It finally leads to the antinomy of priority between to know and to call. (5) A clue to the solution of the dilemma is found in the biblical quotations, which serves to promote his inquiry. In this sense, his philosophico-theological inquiry has the character of a hermeneutical approach. The fifth paragraph consists of three citations: from Rom. 10.14, Ps. 21.27, and Mt. 7.8. It is faith that precedes calling on God. (6) The sixth paragraph returns to the call and the resolution. "Fides quaerens intellectum", known as a motto of theology, exactly represents the Augustinian method of inquiry. His faith, which enables him to call on and to inquire into God, is also given by God through both the incarnation of Christ and the ministry of the Preacher. The Lord is the principle, which causes us to start to inquire into Himself, as well as the goal of the inquiry and the object of our praise.

The mismatch and duplication of Aristotle's two well-known discussions of pleasure in Nicomachean Ethics, books 7 and 10 have been discussed at length to find their proper consistency Pleasure is said, on the one hand, to be an unhindered activity of our natural faculties (1153a14-15), and on the other hand, those of completing or perfecting activities, but must not be identified with them(1174b14-1175b1, 1175b 32-35) The core of the problem is thought to be concerned with the concept of activity (ενεργεια) or the relation between pleasures and activities Recently G. E L. Owen suggested that the two discussions are too divergent to be incompatible because they are neither competing nor co-operating answers to one question, but, rather, respective answers to two quite different questions Needless to say, his point is so serious that it cannot be solved by mere explanations from the developmental view-point of Aristotle's ethical thought Although Owen's analysis is brilliant and surely epoch-making, I suspect his thesis is too strong, because several points of Aristotle's argument, especially the refutation of the anti-hedonistic doctrine, are common to both books It is necessary to investigate the respective contexts introducing "activity" before considering the linguistic analysis of human actions, apart from the text of E N For the evaluation of pleasure, which, as J Annas assumes, is common to both books and irrelevant to the apparent difference between them, depends at least partly on the character of activity In book 7 "energeia" appears 12 times, half of which converge at 1152b33-53a 17. This is the second part of the refutations of the anti-hedonistic theory, where Aristotle rejects the view which identifies pleasure with the physiological process (γενεσιζ), and replaces the activity for it on the basis of the facts that we have pleasures without preceding pains and that sick persons take delight in different things from those healthy ones take pleasure in The question in this context is what is the proper description of pleasure when one feels it, so it is clear that activity and process make an exact counterpart Pleasures can be said to be different from one another according to pleasant things, which are certainly not activities but their objects or sources Admission of variety of pleasures is an important aspect of Aristotle's view of pleasure common to both books For the assumption of pleasure as a unified kind without taking variety of actions provides the ground of (moral and psychological) hedonism (Cf. Gorg. 499B, Phzleb. 12C-E) But it should be noted that in book 10 variety of pleasures is based on that of activities "energeia" is used 40 times (including the verbal infinitive form 10 times), most of which appear after 1174b5 making the central concept in the text Aristotle begins with the case of perceptions. If a sense in the best conditioned organ is in a certain relation to its finest objects, it is most complete, and its activity is necessarily pleasant And then the pleasure intensifies its source activity, and this operation is peculiar to human activity Thus in Aristotle's supposition that activities of a different kind are completed by pleasures of a different kind, we find another understanding of human pleasure : the verbs such as "like", "enjoy", "delight", "indulge" have the intentional aspect, which is different from the unified indistinct kind of pleasure as an overall satisfaction of desire