Kota Umeda

The modern era is known as the age of empathy. In recent years, empathy theory has been subject to criticism from rationalists. If empathy is the “other of reason,” a kind of tendency, then we should not judge according to it. The tradition of autonomism influences this response from rationalism. Autonomy is the giving of law to oneself; heteronomy is that by others. However, can we completely distinguish between the self and the other? The nature of the relationship between the self and the other is what is truly at issue in autonomy. The 19th century German philosopher Nietzsche is generally regarded as an irrationalist or immoral philosopher who aimed at restoring the body and emotions against the dominance of reason. However, owing to his emphasis on autonomy and self-mastery, he is sometimes treated as a rationalist. This paper emphasizes that Nietzsche’s theory of self-mastery and self-control necessarily presupposes a relationship between self and others. Previous studies take Nietzsche’s autonomy as self-relational. However, Nietzsche insisted that autonomy is only possible when it is based on relationships with others. For Nietzsche, autonomy is closely linked to the prohibition of one’s own sympathy for others. In other words, it can be argued that for Nietzsche, autonomy is opposed to sympathy, and the former could only be discussed in the context of the critique of the latter. This study ensures one point of critique of contemporary theories of empathy. Nietzsche criticizes that when empathy means a one-sided empathy for the suffering of others, the otherness of the other could be erased. And, against the anti-empathy argument, it can be argued that autonomy may presuppose a relationship with the other.

A fundamental idea in Nietzsche’s moral critique is his rejection of vengeance. Nietzsche consistently criticizes the idea that sinners should be punished for their sins, seeing it as a single gigantic doxa that has directed the developments of various European morals. In other words, Nietzsche’s ethical thought as a whole can be organized as a virtue ethic that sees retributivism as a vice and reconciliation as a virtue. This paper addressed whether we should also read Nietzsche’s argument of justice in this context, and evaluate it as moral philosophy that aims to restore just relations with others. Nietzsche’s theory of justice in Menschliches, Allzumenschliches has been interpreted by secondary literature such as Elgat (2017) as a discourse that points to the “origin of justice” as “justice as an equilibrium between parties of approximately equal power.” In addition, I focus on the context of Nietzsche’s critique of morality, where he critically argues that the retributive conception of justice has been the foundation of various European morals and has directed their developments. Some previous studies interpret Nietzsche’s notion of justice in Zur Genealogie der Moral as “justice as a mercy.” In that argument as well, we should emphasize the context of the critique of retributive justice. Nietzsche claims that we should put aside ressentiment and stop punishing. I interpret Nietzsche’s argument as a normative claim that we should abandon our desire for punishments, through our pride in being “strong.” In my view, this is because Nietzsche claims that his notion of “will to power” is normative (rather than descriptive). He considers having pride in oneself to be a virtuous way of being. In conclusion, we should read Nietzsche’s argument of justice as a critique of retributivism.

Philosophy can be understood as caring for the soul. In certain Greco–Roman traditions, the methods and doctrines of some schools of philosophy were considered to be therapeutic. For instance, this is acknowledged in texts on ancient medicine, especially those under the name of Hippocrates and also in the teachings of Epicurus. The understanding of philosophy as such was discussed by Nussbaum (1994) and Hadot (1995, 2002), and today the understanding of philosophy as therapeutic or as part of exercices spirituels is considered to shed light on the important role of philosophy. Although philosophy is commonly understood as a purely theoretical activity aimed at discovering truth, it is also widely understood as a part of care that helps us live a healthy and rational life.    Hutter and Friedland (2013) and Faustino (2017) situate Nietzsche’s work in this tradition. Nietzsche referred to himself as a “psychologist” and repeatedly referred to his diagnoses of decadence and asceticism. However, as Werkhoven (2017) noted, the issues that Nietzsche diagnosed may be peculiar to modern people. Hutter (2013) does not explicitly treat of this gap; nevertheless, a certain distinction is needed between Nietzsche and the ancient exemplars of this tradition. Nietzsche’s own description of his therapy focuses on the affirmation of life. This approach assumes the modern understanding of life after the death of God. Here, what is life? What kind of therapy did Nietzsche suggest his suffering contemporaries? To pursue these themes, in this article, I revisit Michel Henry's interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophy in relation to the phenomenology of life. In this context, I draw attention to the phenomenological dimension of Nietzsche’s therapy. I situate both in the tradition of philosophy as the therapy of life, which is an extension of the tradition of philosophical care, which has its origins in ancient times.

ニーチェの『反時代的考察』の第二篇「生に対する歴史の利害について」でニーチェは科学化へ向かう歴史学を批判し, 「生に奉仕する歴史」を考案していることが先行研究によって明らかにされてきた. 本稿では, ニーチェの歴史哲学的と呼べる思惟が, 処女作『悲劇の誕生』とも接続可能な「過去といかに向き合うか」という問題設定をもっていることを明らかにした. これにより, それまで『悲劇の誕生』のみ分離してきた従来のニーチェ哲学解釈に対し, 通時的な問題設定が可能であることを示した.